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While piracy is an age-old crime, it has recently
re-emerged in different forms off the Coast of Somalia, in the
Gulf of Guinea, and through the international straits of
Indonesia. Acts of piracy surged off the Somali Coast of
Somalia between 2008 and 2011 and began to decline over the
past year. However, while piracy may have begun its decline off
the Coast of Somalia, it is now growing steadily elsewhere,
including on the East Coast of Africa in the Gulf of Guinea,
Indonesia, and Malaysia. This article discusses these current
global trends in piracy. It also describes successful efforts that
the international community has used to combat piracy off the
Coast of Somalia, and assesses whether these efforts can be
exported to other piracy hotbeds around the world.
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I.

Introduction

While piracy is an age-old crime, it has recently re-emerged in a
few different varieties off the Coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Guinea,
and through the international straits of Indonesia. Global acts of
piracy rose quickly off the Coast of Somalia from 2008 to 2011,1 and
then fell during the 2013 time period,2 signaling possible success in the
international methods used to combat piracy in this region. Most
notably, but possibly not as a direct consequence of the decline, key
pirate leader Mohamed Abdi Hassan announced “his retirement” from
the Somali pirate business,3 demonstrating just how commonplace
piracy has become in the life of Somalis. However, while piracy may
1.

In 2011 alone, there were more than 270 attacks in Somalia, nearly
twice the annual number in each of the previous three years. See U.N.
Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on Specialized
Anti-Piracy Courts in Somalia and Other States in the Region, ¶ 7,
U.N. Doc. S/2012/50 (Jan. 20, 2012).

2.

In 2011, approximately 275 of the 439 global piracy attacks occurred off
of the Coast of Somalia. Piracy & Armed Robbery News & Figures, ICC
COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS. (Aug. 13, 2013); see also Annette Leijenaar
& Timothy Walker, Rooting Out Somali Piracy Starts On-Shore, ISS
AFR. (July 9, 2012), http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/rooting-outsomali-piracy-starts-on-shore. On the other hand, in the first
three-quarters of 2013, there have only been eleven reported piracy
attacks in Somalia, versus thirty in Nigeria. Piracy & Armed Robbery
News & Figures, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS. (Oct. 22, 2013),
www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures.

3.

See Adjoa Anyimadu, Notorious Somali Pirate Quits: Now Is Shipping
Safe?, CNN (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/11/opinion/
somalia-pirate-retires/.
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be declining off the Coast of Somalia, it is now growing steadily on
the East Coast of Africa in the Gulf of Guinea,4 Indonesia5 and
Malaysia, among other regions.6 This article will first discuss the
current global trends in piracy and how they are emerging. It will
next identify the methods that the international community has used
to effectively counter the piracy threat off the Coast of Somalia,
contributing to piracy’s sharp decline over the past year. Finally, this
article will assess whether these methods, which have been so
successful off the Coast of Somalia can be exported to address the
emerging piracy threat in the Gulf of Guinea and other piracy
hotbeds around the world.

II. Global Trends in Piracy
From 2001 to 2010, Indonesia and Somalia had roughly the same
number of pirate attacks, with 990 in Indonesia and 968 in Somalia,
although Somalia’s annual number grew tenfold over this time period
while Indonesia’s declined.7 Comparatively, Nigeria was in third place,
with 330 attacks over this time period, also growing sharply toward
the end of this period.8 As indicated above, the number of attacks in
Somalia is now in decline, while the number of attacks in Nigeria and
the Gulf of Guinea are on the rise, and Indonesia continues to face
significant challenges with piracy.9 In Indonesia, the number of piracy
attacks remains high, with sixty-eight attacks for 2013 by the end of
4.

See Lisa Millar, Pirates Kidnap Two American Sailors in the Gulf of
Guinea
off
Nigeria,
ABC
NEWS
(Oct.
25,
2013),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-25/pirates-kidnap-two-americansailors-off-nigeria/5045250 (noting that the “International Maritime
Bureau . . . recorded 31 pirate attacks in the first half of 2013”).

5.

See Adelia Anjani Putri et al., Pirate Attacks on the Rise in Indonesia:
Report, JAKARTA GLOBE (Jul. 25, 2013), http://www.thejakartaglobe.
com/news/pirate-attacks-on-the-rise-in-indonesia-report/ (reporting that
attacks in Indonesia grew by 50 percent in the first half of 2013).

6.

See Godwin Oritse & Onyegbadue Amamdi, Nigeria, Indonesia Others
Rank High in Piracy, VANGUARD NGR. (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://vanguardngr.com/2013/10/nigeria-indonesia-others-rank-highpiracy/ (noting that as of October 2013, Indonesia had the highest
number of attacks, with sixty-eight pirate attacks).

7.

Anamika Agnieszka Twyman-Ghoshal, Understanding Contemporary
Maritime Piracy 79–80 (May 1, 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Northeastern University) (on file with the Northeastern University
Libraries system), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2047/d20002928.

8.

Id.

9.

See Live Piracy & Armed Robbery Report 2014, ICC COMMERCIAL
CRIME
SERVS.,
http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/livepiracy-report (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) (indicating that several recent
piracy attacks occurred in Indonesia).
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October, but these attacks have been characterized as lower level in
nature and far less violent.10
While not every act of piracy is the same, there are general
regional trends in how acts of piracy are carried out. Recent
“Somali-style” piracy has been characterized by smaller ships using
arms and modern GPS systems to take larger vessels by force.11 A
principal tactic used in Somali piracy has been the kidnapping of crew
members for ransom.12 These acts of piracy have generally been
carried out by lower level pirate foot soldiers,13 many of whom are
poor juveniles from Somalia. The higher-ups who have financed and
led Somali piracy are smaller in number and have generally not been
involved in the acts of piracy themselves, but have greatly profited
from the enterprise.14 In 2011, the U.N. estimated that numbers of
pirates included 10-20 financiers, 50 main pirate leaders, 300 leaders
of pirate attack groups, and approximately 2,500 lower level foot
soldiers.15 At the peak of the Somali piracy epidemic in 2010-2011,
pirates were reported to have caused more than $25 billion in losses16
with great profit to the senior leaders of this enterprise. Further, in
response to this growing trend, insurance companies saw increased
sales of kidnap and ransom policies, paying out large ransoms for
piracy-associated kidnappings.17
While some basic elements of piracy attacks are similar
everywhere—pirates attack vessels and tend to avoid attacking vessels
at sea rather than in port where there is security and lighting18—there
10.

Oritse & Amamdi, supra note 6.

11.

See Sandra L. Hodgkinson et al., Piracy: New Efforts in Addressing
This Enduring Problem, 36 TUL. MAR. L.J. 65, 68–69 (2011).

12.

See Mary Beth Quirk, Kidnap & Ransom Insurance: In Case You’re
Ever Around Somali Pirates, CONSUMERIST (July 1, 2013),
http://www.consumerist.com/2013/07/01/kidnap-ransom-insurance-incase-youre-ever-around-somali-pirates/; see also Twyman-Ghoshal,
supra note 7, at 122.

13.

See David Axe, War is Boring: Amateurish Foot Soldiers Belie
Sophisticated Piracy Networks, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (May 6, 2009),
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/3710/war-is-boringamateurish-foot-soldiers-belie-sophisticated-piracy-networks.

14.

See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary General on the
Modalities for the Establishment of Specialized Somali Anti-Piracy
Courts, Annex I ¶¶ 1, 3, U.N. Doc. S/2011/360 (June 15, 2001).

15.

Id. ¶ 3.

16.

Roger L. Phillips, Upcoming Event: Panel on Establishment of a Special
Anti-Piracy Tribunal: Prospects and Reality, COMMUNIS HOSTIS OMNIUM
(Feb. 5, 2012), http://piracy-law.com/author/archipirata/page/10/.

17.

Quirk, supra note 12.

18.

See Twyman-Ghoshal, supra note 7, at 83.
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are some key distinctions in how global piracy trends are emerging. In
the Gulf of Guinea, for example, the overall trend for piracy attacks
over the past year has been more traditional, in that pirates are
focused on stealing ships’ cargoes, principally oil,19 rather than
kidnapping crews for ransom. This is partly because of the significant
transit of oil from Nigeria and the region through the Gulf of Guinea,
both legitimate and illegitimate to include oil bunkering.20
Notwithstanding cargo seizures, there are some very recent reports of
kidnapping in Nigeria and a rising concern that many abductions are
not reported so as to avoid scrutiny over amounts paid.21
The general territories of piracy attacks have also changed in
recent years. In Somalia, much of the piracy has occurred in the high
seas; in contrast, the majority of the Gulf of Guinea piracy incidents
occur within the territorial waters of Nigeria and Benin.22 In Asia as
well, including Indonesia, piracy attacks also tend to occur closer to
shore, where pirates know the islands, inlets and waterways, rather
than in the high seas.23
A more generic trend that is not specific to any one region is the
shift from piracy being a purely nocturnal crime to one that may just
as likely occur in the daytime.24 Also, while traditionally pirate
attacks were carried out on stationary vessels, they are now also likely
to occur when the target ship is moving, although this trend is more
visible in Somalia and Indonesia than in other regions.25 A more
traditional trend, theft continues to be a principal motivator for
piracy attacks globally, making the kidnappings in Somalia,26 and now
possibly Nigeria,27 exceptions rather than the rule.
19.

See Millar, supra note 4.

20.

See, e.g., Rick Gladstone, Pirates Abduct Two Americans on Oil Ship
off Nigerian Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2013, at A4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/25/world/africa/two-americanmariners-abducted-off-nigerian-coast.html?_r=0 (reporting that a piracy
attack occurred where “the oil-rich Niger Delta empties into the Gulf of
Guinea, in West Africa”).

21.

Millar, supra note 4; Gladstone, supra note 20.

22.

See Punch Editorial Board, Tackling Piracy in Nigeria’s Territorial
Waters, PUNCH (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.punchng.com/editorial/
tackling-piracy-in-nigerias-territorial-waters/ (“Of the 30 deaths
recorded in the first half of 2009, half occurred in Nigeria’s territorial
waters, according to IMB.”).

23.

Twyman-Ghoshal, supra note 7, at 80–81.

24.

Id. at 90.

25.

Id. at 98–99.

26.

See id. at 121–29 (describing motivations for piracy in several
countries).

27.

See, e.g., Gladstone, supra note 20.
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III. Decline of Piracy off the Coast of Somalia – How
Did It Happen?
The decline in Somali piracy can be largely credited to the four
principal ways the international community has used to address the
problem: (1) maritime patrols by international naval forces;
(2) industry development of a series of “Best Management Practices”
(BMPs)28 for preventing piracy attacks; (3) the increased use of armed
security personnel on board ships; and (4) the increase in
international prosecutions for the crime of piracy.
A.

Maritime Patrols by International Naval Forces

Deployment of maritime patrols by international naval forces has
been a well-coordinated international effort that has developed to
combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. In 2008, the European Union
first created EU NAVFOR Somalia (“European Naval Force”) under
the auspices of U.N. Security Council Resolutions.29 The purpose of
this initial naval force was to protect vulnerable ships off the Somali
coast and deliver food aid.30 Around the same time, NATO also
created a Standing NATO Maritime Group and conducted Operation
Allied Provider, which escorted World Food Program vessels and
patrolled the region to the extent possible.31 Operation Allied
Protector and Operation Ocean Shield followed over the next few
years, making the NATO contribution to this anti-piracy effort
extremely significant.32
The U.S. began its own antipiracy operation, Combined Task
Force 151 (CTF-151), in January 2009 that had an exclusive

28.

BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO DETER PIRACY IN THE GULF OF ADEN
AND OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA (2009) [hereinafter BMP2], available at
http://www.nee.gr/downloads/26BMP.pdf; BMP 4: BEST MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST SOMALI BASED PIRACY 1 (2011)
[hereinafter BMP4], available at http://www.mschoa.org/docs/publicdocuments/bmp4_low_res_sep_5_2011.pdf.

29.

EU Naval Operation Against Piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia –
Operation ATALANTA), COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/100201%20Factshe
et%20EU%20NAVFOR%20Somalia%20-%20version%2014_EN.pdf (last
updated Feb. 2010).

30.

Id.

31.

Counter-Piracy Operations, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/topics_48815.htm#Protector (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).

32.

See id.; see also Press Release, Allied Mar. Command, NATO Warships
Meet for Counter Piracy Mission Handover (Mar. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.manw.nato.int/pdf/Press%20Releases%202010/Jan%20%20May%202010/SNMG%20Operational%20Handover12Mar10.pdf.
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counter-piracy mission.33 The Indian Navy also contributed vessels,34
the Chinese Navy deployed a task force,35 and the Japanese Maritime
Self Defense Force deployed several vessels as well, all to support
counter piracy efforts.36 These international maritime interdiction
forces have been extremely effective at countering the piracy threat.37
Recently, British naval forces, operating as part of the Combined
Military Forces (CMF) counter piracy task force, apprehended nine
pirates after they attempted to pirate the supertanker Island Splendor
using gunfire and then attacked a Spanish vessel.38
Given that much of the piracy off the Coast of Somalia has taken
place in the high seas, these international naval forces have had to do
their best to cover large amounts of territory at a high cost. Further,
based on the consent of the Somali government, the U.N. Security
Council passed a series of Chapter VII resolutions, beginning with
U.N. Security Council 1816,39 which authorized countries to take
action within Somalia’s territorial seas that would otherwise only be
permitted on the high seas under the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) or other international law. This language, in
effect, takes the well-known UNCLOS resolutions and applies them
33.

New Counter-Piracy Task Force Established, U.S. NAVY (Jan. 8, 2009),
http://www.navy.mil/SEARCH/display.asp?story_id=41687.

34.

India ‘To Step Up Piracy Battle’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7741287.stm.

35.

Ranjit B. Rai, China’s Fast Growing Navy, INDIA STRATEGIC
(Jan. 2010), http://wwwindiastrategic.in/topstories470.htm.

36.

Japan Destroyers Set Sail on Anti-Piracy Mission, CNN
(Apr. 20, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/03/14/
japan.pirates/index.

37.

See RADM Joseph W. Kuzmick, Navy Efforts to Combat Piracy
Continue, NAVY LIVE (Apr. 11, 2013), http://navylive.dodlive.mil/
2013/04/11/navy-efforts-to-combat-piracy-continue/ (attributing part of
the successful anti-piracy efforts to international naval forces); see also
Thom Shanker, U.S. Reports That Piracy off Africa Has Plunged, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/29/world/
africa/piracy-around-horn-of-africa-has-plunged-us-says.html?_r=0.

38.

Ellen Branagh, Suspected Somali Pirates Captured by Navy-Led Forces
After Attack on Supertanker, THE INDEPENDENT (Oct. 21, 2013),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/suspected-somalipirates-captured-by-navyled-forces-after-attack-on-supertanker8894344.html.

39.

S.C. Res. 1816, paras. 3, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008)
(authorizing the use of force against Somali pirates in Somalia’s
territorial waters). Subsequent U.N. Security Council Resolutions
reiterated or included the same authorization, such as S.C. Res. 1838,
pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, para. 10,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, para. 3, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008).
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within Somalia’s territorial seas.40 Accordingly, the international naval
forces had additional latitude to operate within Somalia’s territorial
seas and apply UNCLOS’ provisions.
B.

Best Management Practices

The shipping industry has also contributed heavily to the
reduction of piracy incidences off the coast of Somalia through its
development of BMPs for preventing piracy attacks.41 The most
recent version from 2011, BMP4, included simple steps, such as
reporting and registration procedures, posting additional look-outs on
shipping vessels, re-routing ships away from heavily pirated waters,
and even posting dummies on ships to make it appear as though there
are larger crews.42 Other measures include: sounding alarms, evasive
maneuvering, increasing lighting, establishing a safe lockable “citadel”
for crews, and installing closed-circuit television.43
BMP4 also recommends increased training of crews to identify
and address piracy and keeping a ship’s speed at least at eighteen
knots, or at “full sea speed,” when transiting pirated waters to make
it more difficult for pirates to catch and stop the ships.44 The
widespread adoption and use of these BMPs throughout the industry
has mitigated the risk of pirate attacks across the board.45 Perhaps
the most interesting recent tactic ships have used to ward off pirates
is the blaring of music, particularly Britney Spears.46 Apparently,
pirates do not like loud music, and according to a particular crew,
Ms. Spears’ songs were selected because the “pirates would hate them
most.”47
C.

Armed Security Guards on Ships

The development of armed security personnel on ships, either as
government-provided Vessel Protection Detail (VPD) or as Privately
Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP), was considered a
40.

Hodgkinson et al., supra note 11, at 96.

41.

Twyman-Ghoshal, supra note 7, at 128.

42.

Id. at 128; see BMP2, supra note 28; BMP4, supra note 28.

43.

BMP4, supra note 28, at 25–40; Twyman-Ghoshal, supra note 7, at 128.

44.

BMP4, supra note 28, at 7, 10.

45.

Thomas Kelly, Remarks at Combating Piracy Week on the U.S.
Government’s Approach to Countering Somali Piracy (Oct. 25, 2012),
available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/199929.htm.

46.

Steve White, Britney Spears Music Blasted out by Merchant Navy to
(Oct.
27,
2013),
SCARE
off
Somali
Pirates,
MIRROR
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/weird-news/britney-spears-musicblasted-out-2646660.

47.

Id.
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“game-changer” by the U.S. government in 2012 in the effort to
combat piracy.48 In fact, to date, no ship with armed security guards
has been pirated,49 which serves as a testament to the effectiveness of
these guards or at least demonstrates that their mere presence on the
ships may serve as a good deterrent against would-be pirates.
However, from the outset, these armed security personnel have been
controversial, partly out of a concern over escalating violence and
partly over costs and resources.50 The average ship using armed
security personnel has approximately four armed security guards to
help protect the crew and cargo, which can cost up to $45,000 in a
high-risk area.51 This additional cost of security is offset by lower
insurance premiums but nonetheless drives up the cost of piracy for
the shipping industry.52
D.

International Piracy Prosecutions

At present, there are more than 1,000 pirates who have recently
been brought to justice in twenty countries.53 This is a tremendous
tribute to the many regional countries that have shouldered the
burden of prosecuting these piracy cases either under domestic or
universal jurisdiction. Kenya, the Seychelles, and Mauritius have led
the way in piracy prosecutions, working with the support of the
U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)54 and other international
48.

Kelly, supra note 45.

49.

Id.

50.

See Hodgkinson et al., supra note 11, at 112–13; see also P. Manoj,
Armed Guards Back in Spotlight After Detention of Anti-Piracy Ship in
India, LIVEMINT (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/
tP9S8lnqPVPEojiojRNSQO/Armed-guards-back-in-spotlight-afterdetention-of-antipirac.html (reporting how a ship owned by a U.S.-based
maritime security firm was intercepted in Indian territorial waters,
where it was found with heavy weaponry without valid permits).

51.

Laws
and
Guns,
THE
ECONOMIST
http://www.economist.com/node/21552553.

52.

Id.

53.

U.S. Hails Life Prison Terms for Somali Pirates, VOICE OF AM.
(Aug. 7, 2013),
http://www.voanews.com/content/us-hails-life-prisonterms-for-somali-pirates/1725590.html (citing a statement from U.S.
State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki).

54.

U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME [UNODC], COUNTER-PIRACY
PROGRAMME: SUPPORT TO THE TRIAL AND RELATED TREATMENT OF
PIRACY SUSPECTS, ISSUE 5, at 5–6 (2011), available at
http://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/piracy/index.html (describing
UNODC’s achievements in Kenya, including training for police officers
and prosecutors and refurbished police buildings). See generally Council
Decision 2011/640/CFSP, Agreement Between the European Union and
the Republic of Mauritius on the Conditions of Transfer of Suspected
Pirates and Associated Seized Property from the European Union-Led
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donors in support of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1851. UNODC
has developed a piracy prosecution capacity-building program for
Somalia and for these other regional countries, which focuses on
training programs and international legal support to strengthen the
capacity of judges, prosecutors, and investigators involved in piracy
cases.55 The program also addresses prison capacity issues, such as
over-crowding and treatment, through the development of new
facilities, funding, and training programs for prison personnel.56 One
interesting aspect of the UNODC effort to strengthen prison capacity
in Somalia has been its role in facilitating transfer arrangements
between these prosecuting countries and Somalia, allowing convicted
pirates to serve out their sentences in Somalia.57 This facilitation has
alleviated some of the burden on these prosecuting states’ prison
systems while bringing these pirates back to their home country.58
European and U.S. courts have also conducted several
prosecutions, although principally these cases concerned individuals
who pirated their own flag-state vessels, or vessels being crewed by
their nationals; these prosecutions were not initiated as an exercise of
universal jurisdiction. The relatively modest penalties in several
European cases—five to ten years in prison59—have also raised
Naval Force to the Republic of Mauritius and on the Conditions of
Suspected Pirates After Transfer, 2011 O.J. (L254) 1, 3.
55.

UNODC, supra note 54, at 4.

56.

Id. at 9–11.

57.

Id. at 11.

58.

Id.; see also AMBER RAMSEY, CIVIL MILITARY FUSION CTR., REGIONAL
COURTS AND PRISONS: DEVELOPING LOCAL CAPACITY TO PROSECUTE
SOMALI PIRATES 4 (2012), available at https://www.cimicweb.org/
Documents/CFC%20Anti-Piracy%20Thematic%20Papers/CFC_AntiPiracy_Report_Courts_and_Prisons_JAN_2012_FINAL.pdf
(describing how prosecuting regional states have limited prison capacity,
and thus prisoner transfer agreements with Somalia relieve this burden).

59.

See, e.g., Dutch Court Convicts Five Somalis of Piracy, TELEGRAPH
(June 17, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/
7836714/Dutch-court-convicts-five-Somalis-of-piracy.html (reporting on
the conviction and five-year sentence of the M/V Samanyolu pirates and
noting the harsh living conditions in Somalia as a mitigating factor in
the sentencing); Roger L. Phillips, Long Road to Justice – The German
Piracy Trial, COMMUNIS HOSTIS OMNIUM (Oct. 21, 2012), http://piracylaw.com/2012/10/21/long-road-to-justice-the-german-piracy-trial/
(noting that the German court in the MV Taipan case sentenced adult
pirates to six to seven years and only two years for the juveniles); see
also Eugene Kontorovich, The Penalties for Piracy: An Empirical Study
of National Prosecution of International Crime 13–14 (Northwestern
Univ. Sch. of Law Scholarly Commons, Working Paper No. 211, 2012),
available
at
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/faculty
workingpapers/211 (discussing the disparities between sentencing
regimes in different piracy prosecuting states).
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concerns that these pirates will seek asylum in their new “countries”
upon release from jail, creating a disincentive for countries to exercise
universal jurisdiction over piracy cases in general.60 U.S. penalties
have been much higher, but the financial costs of the U.S. justice
system make large-scale support for piracy prosecutions under
universal jurisdiction unlikely.61
However, despite the challenges and initial concerns that the fear
of conviction could never outweigh the potential gains to a Somali
pirate and thus dissuade him from piratical behavior, the
international prosecutions for piracy have been one of the principal
deterrents to the rise in piracy. According to Ambassador Thomas
Winkler of Denmark, Chairman of the Legal Committee of the
Contact Group for Piracy, “[t]he number of active pirates is perhaps
3,000. So if you put a thousand behind bars, and 300-400 die every
year at sea from hunger (or) drowning . . . you will quickly come
down.”62

IV. Exporting Success to Other Piracy Hotbeds Such
as the Gulf of Guinea and Indonesia
There is no question that some combination of these four effective
tactics explained above to combat piracy off the Coast of Somalia, in
addition to the natural perils of the life of a pirate, has resulted in a
significant decline in the number of piracy attacks. Many skeptics of
counter piracy initiatives have expressed the view that the only real
way to fix the Somali problem is through efforts to politically stabilize
the region.63 While such capacity-building efforts continue and some
progress has been made, Somalia still has political challenges and
extreme poverty that would normally help perpetuate the piracy

60.

Yvonne M. Dutton, Pirates and Impunity: Is the Threat of Asylum
Claims a Reason to Allow Pirates to Escape Justice, 34 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 236, 239–41 (2011).

61.

The estimated cost of piracy trials and imprisonment in 2010 was
approximately $31 million. See OCEANS BEYOND PIRACY, THE ECONOMIC
COST OF PIRACY 1 (2011), available at http://www.ics-shipping.org/
docs/default-source/Piracy-Docs/the-economic-cost-of-piracy.pdf?sfvrsn
=0.

62.

No Somali Pirate Hijacking in Nearly a Year, Says UN, THE GUARDIAN
(May 3, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/03/
somali-pirate-hijacking.

63.

See, e.g., Ending Somali Piracy: Go After the System, Not Just the
Pirates,
THE
WORLD
BANK
(Apr.
11,
2013),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/04/11/ending-somalipiracy-go-after-the-system-not-just-the-pirates (stating that “[p]iracy is a
symptom of the breakdown of Somalia’s political system”).
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epidemic,64 making the Somali anti-piracy successes even more
astonishing. This now begs the question as to whether these effective
Somali-specific tactics will be able to successfully counter piracy in
the Gulf of Guinea, Indonesia, and elsewhere, or whether to the
contrary, like the drug trade, pirates will either move to the most
vulnerable location or indigenously grow there.
A.

Gulf of Guinea

A cornerstone of the Somali effort was the use of international
naval forces, both in the high seas and in the territorial sea of
Somalia.65 The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency
(NIMASA) has launched an anti-piracy campaign to tackle robbery,
illegal oil bunkering, and piracy in Nigeria’s territorial waters66 and
recently announced a plan for three patrol boats dedicated exclusively
to preventing and combating piracy and sea-armed robbery.67
NIMASA reports that it has arrested more than fifty people this year
for piracy and oil theft, some of which are now in the Nigerian court
system.68 NIMASA reports that it is working to address the rise in
piracy in the Gulf of Guinea by strengthening their Memorandum of
Understanding with the Nigerian Navy.69 These domestic law
enforcement efforts will be an important part of Nigeria’s ability to
curb this growing threat. While the international naval force strategy
was effective in Somalia, it is unlikely to be a critical part of the Gulf
of Guinea plan, as the territorial waters in the Gulf of Guinea are
very shallow.70 Furthermore, given the territorial integrity and
64.

See Anyimadu, supra note 3 (describing how piracy is the result of
economic and political shortcomings, and that the lack of employment
opportunities makes piracy an attractive option to Somali men).

65.

Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments
off the Coast of Somalia, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 399, 399–408 (2009)
(reviewing various countries’ naval anti-piracy efforts in Somalia).

66.

Containing Activities of Pirates in Nigeria’s Territorial Waters,
HELLENIC
SHIPPING
NEWS
(Jun.
22,
2013),
http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/News.aspx?ElementId=f2dc00788942-492c-bd42-e5afca9fa679.

67.

John Iwori, Nigeria: NIMASA Unveils Three Patrol Boats to Fight
Piracy, ALL AFR. (Oct. 11, 2013), http://allafrica.com/stories/
201310110593.html.

68.

Andrew Utulu, NIMASA: Waging War Against Piracy, Oil Theft,
DAILY INDEPENDENT, http://www.dailyindependentnig.com/2013/01/
nimasa-waging-war-against-piracy-oil-theft/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2014).

69.

NIMASA, Navy Reappraise Maritime Security MoU, SHIPS & PORTS,
http://www.shipsandports.com.ng/news.php?id=764 (last updated Oct.
24, 2012).

70.

See Emil Maine, Surging Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Threatens U.S.
Interests, THE FOUNDRY (Oct. 28, 2013, 5:48 PM), http://blog.
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sovereignty of Nigeria and other countries in this region, there has not
yet been an effort to develop a U.N. Security Council endorsed plan.
However, just recently, West African leaders have established a new
working group to address piracy that will combine maritime law
enforcement efforts.71
Instead of an international naval force strategy, the U.S. military
is using its 2007 Africa Partnership Station as an international
platform to build maritime law enforcement capacity and
interoperability of coastal state Navies through theater security and
cooperation exercises.72 This strategy has greatly enhanced the
abilities of other African states to combat piracy.73 Under this
program, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, with participation from African,
European, and South American forces, has been hosting four different
regional maritime security exercises, including Obangame Express,
Cutlass Express, Saharan Express, and Phoenix Express.74 Nigeria also
hosted Spain, Britain, the Netherlands, and the U.S. in October 2013
for maritime security joint training operations.75 These efforts to
strengthen domestic capabilities to address the piracy and other
criminal threats in coastal waters may become one of the more
effective tools for the Gulf of Guinea—provided of course that the
host country governments in Nigeria and Benin take the threat
seriously.
In addition, ships passing through the Gulf of Guinea area should
consider armed security personnel and applicable BMPs,76 as these
methods have been effective in both territorial waters and the high
seas. Although NIMASA reports an increase in both arrests and
prosecutions of pirates over the past year,77 there does not appear to
be enough data about the effectiveness of prosecutions. Given that
there have been concerns over the rule of law in Nigeria in general,78
heritage.org/2013/10/28/surging-piracy-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-threatensu-s-interests/.
71.

Heather Murdock, West African Leaders Promise to Combat Piracy
Surge, ALL AFR. (Oct. 31, 2013), http://allafrica.cpm/stories/
201311011233.html.

72.

Kuzmick, supra note 37.

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

Murdock, supra note 71.

76.

See Maine, supra note 70.

77.

See Utulu, supra note 68.

78.

See Maine, supra note 70 (describing the political environment in West
Africa, where pirates are able to “take advantage of a well-established
illicit political economy” and “pre-existing international criminal
networks”).
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whether the government can and will strongly get behind a
prosecution regime remains to be seen. That said, the Somali model
does have something to offer here on capacity-building. At this time,
there is no reason to expect other regional or international countries
will play a leading role in prosecuting these pirates as they did in
Somalia. Third countries may only take jurisdiction over piracy
attacks against their own nationals or flag-state vessels. Accordingly,
a capacity-building program like the one developed for Somalia could
be useful in the Gulf of Guinea and could have the collateral benefit
of strengthening the rule of law in Nigeria, Benin, and throughout the
region.79
West Africa also has a recent history rife with international
criminal networks that are being leveraged by these pirates, in
contrast with Somalia’s more general inability to govern.80 The pirates
operating in the Gulf of Guinea are able to leverage these criminal
networks that have pre-existing leverage with local government
officials and military members.81 Accordingly, the ability to trace and
prevent these attacks may be harder, and there may be less
enthusiasm by government officials to embrace methods that will
effectively combat piracy.
B.

Indonesia

Indonesian piracy also occurs closer to shore than it does in
Somalia,82 but unlike Nigerian piracy, Indonesian piracy tends to be
less organized and more opportunistic.83 The lack of effective maritime
law enforcement in Indonesia contributes to this problem and will
require the Indonesian Navy and the National Police to increase their
capabilities.84 While they have a reasonable enough force size, they are
responsible for a vast expanse of maritime domain spanning six
million square kilometers and 17,500 islands (6,000 inhabited) and
have significant problems with illegal logging and fishing, which are
often higher priorities for the government.85 So far, requests for a
79.

See generally Elijah Okon John, The Rule of Law in Nigeria: Myth or
Reality?, 4 J. POL. & L. 211 (2011) (arguing that while the rule of law is
enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution, there is blatant disrespect for
rule of law by Nigeria’s senior leadership).

80.

See Maine, supra note 70.

81.

Id.

82.

Twyman-Ghoshal, supra note 7, at 80–81.

83.

Putri et al., supra note 5.

84.

Id.

85.

S. RAJARATNAM SCH. OF INT’L STUDIES, POLICY REPORT: INDONESIA’S
NAVAL DEVELOPMENT AND MARITIME COOPERATION 3 (2012), available
at
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_report/Indonesia_
Naval_Development_Maritime_Cooperation_5_July_2012.pdf;
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multilateral initiative involving neighboring states have gone
unanswered, but there has been a recent suggestion that perhaps
Australia could step in and assist, as it assisted Indonesia in the
aftermath of the Bali bombings.86 If so, Indonesia could benefit from
joint naval patrols and assistance to help police their waters. As with
the Gulf of Guinea, efforts in Indonesia to use armed security
personnel and BMPs will clearly help to combat the increase in piracy
and perhaps will be an even more effective deterrent given that the
attacks tend to be more opportunistic and less organized.
Similar to the model used to address piracy in Somalia, regional
courts in Indonesia, Malaysia and other neighboring states should all
step up efforts to ensure that they are prosecuting as many of the
pirates in the region as possible. Capacity-building efforts should also
be explored to address deficiencies and conditions in Indonesia that
might contribute to piracy.
C.

Elsewhere

Piracy exists in many other parts of the world and will ebb and
flow in response to regional circumstances. While not every tool is
necessarily effective in each location, it appears that broad use of
BMPs is both scalable to address cost burdens on ships and useful in
minimizing the number of successful attacks. Armed security
personnel were effective in Somalia, and as long as they remain
affordable enough and do not generally begin to escalate the level of
violence in pirate attacks, they are also a good tactic for ships to
employ wherever they may be.
Despite the extremely effective use of international naval patrols
off the coast of Somalia, partly fueled by the U.S., U.N., and
European calls for action, it is difficult to imagine that this level of
maritime support will be afforded in other regions of the world due to
the expense and effort. Instead, countries should welcome
international support for their domestic maritime law enforcement
capabilities and interoperability with neighboring states along the
lines of the current Africa Partnership Station program. Additionally,
regional alliances or support from more capable neighboring allies,
consistent with possible Australian support for Indonesia, can also
help increase maritime law enforcement capacity and reduce the
piracy threat.
With respect to prosecution, the best case scenario is to have
domestic court systems that can effectively prosecute piracy cases.
Andrew Manners, Piracy on the Rise in Indonesia: Can Australia
Help?, FUTURE DIRECTIONS INT’L (Jul. 31, 2013), http://www.
futuredirections.org.au/publications/indonesia/45-indonesia-swaarticles/1226-piracy-on-the-rise-in-indonesia-can-australia-help.html.
86.

Manners, supra note 87.
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When that is not possible, capacity-building efforts, like the UNODC
effort for Somalia, is the best solution, as it promotes prosecution in
the country closest to where the crime occurred and has a potential
collateral spill-over effect of promoting justice and the rule of law as a
whole. The establishment of an international piracy tribunal is
extremely unlikely given the current level of tribunal fatigue, the
historical financial costs of establishing new, international tribunals,
and the fact that domestic prosecutions, as a whole, are on the rise.87
Specialized, anti-piracy courts are one option, but as Jack Lang and
the U.N. explored in the context of Somalia, capacity-building efforts
for the regular domestic court system may be a better choice given
that the efforts do not require new facilities and new courts and can
have a positive impact on the justice system.88

V. Conclusion
As recent as a year ago, there were few to no predictions of a
rapid decline in piracy off the Coast of Somalia. The international
community was skeptical that there was too much to gain for a
would-be pirate and not enough deterrent. Further, there were
concerns that domestic and regional prosecution capacity was too
weak to be effective. There was not yet enough recognition of the
value that the armed security personnel and BMPs would contribute.
Notwithstanding these doubts, these methods all together worked.
There has been no evidence that the Somali pirate leaders have fled to
other regions, such as the Gulf of Guinea, to carry out their work
there either. Even though the piracy characteristics vary from region
to region, countries facing piracy problems should aim to combine
BMPs and armed security personnel, and focus efforts on domestic
prosecutions and strengthening capacity as needed. Where local
maritime law enforcement capabilities are more limited,
piracy-afflicted countries should seek international partnerships and
assistance to strengthen their capacity. Pirates beware—this age-old
crime did not take ages to counter in Somalia.

87.

Sandra L. Hodgkinson, Establishment of a Special Anti-Piracy Tribunal:
Prospective and Reality, the Challenges Associated with Prosecuting
Somali Pirates in a Special Anti-Piracy Tribunal, 19 ILSA J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 305, 312–13, 317 (2013).

88.

See id. at 312 (stating that instead of proposing specialized anti-piracy
courts, “there may well be an appetite for morphing this proposal into
an enhanced UNDP and UNODC-style capacity-building plan for
Somalia, leveraging the existing court structures”).
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